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Abstract
In this article we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner’s argument [1] taking into account that
the assertions of the argument are made at different times. In order to do that, we use a formalism
that allows dealing with quantum properties at different times: the Theory of Consistent Histories.
We show that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing prob-
abilities in a family of histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, a non legitimate
move in this theory.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published online an article in
which they introduced a Gedankenexperiment that led them to conclude that “no single-
world interpretation can be logically consistent” [2]. In a new version of the paper, published
in Nature Communications in September 2018, the authors moderate their original claim,
concluding “that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not
in a straightforward manner” [1].
Since its first online publication, the Frauchiger and Renner (F-R) argument was exten-
sively commented in the field of quantum foundations, since it was considered as a new no-go
result for quantum mechanics whose strength relies on the fact that it is neutral regarding
interpretation: on the basis of three seemingly reasonable assumptions that do not include
interpretive premises, the argument leads to a contradiction. This fact has been conceived
as pointing to a deep shortcoming of quantum mechanics itself, which contrasts with the
extraordinary success of the theory.
In a previous article [3] a careful reconstruction of the F-R argument has been offered,
which shows that the contradiction resulting from the F-R argument is inferred by making
classical conjunctions between different and incompatible contexts and, as a consequence,
it is the result of a theoretically illegitimate inference. However, recently1 it has been
suggested that the criticism does not take into account the fact that the inferences in the
F-R argument are all carefully timed, and that this fact would circumvent the objection
based on the contextuality of quantum mechanics. The purpose of this article is to analyze
such a defense of the F-R argument.
If timing really matters in the F-R argument, it must be reconstructed by means of a
formalism that allows defining logical operations between quantum facts at different times
and computing probabilities combining them, something that is not formally defined in the
standard formalism . The idea of quantum histories was mainly motivated by this limitation
of standard quantum mechanics. In 1984, Robert Griffiths presented the first version of his
Theory of Consistent Histories [4]; some years later, he introduced some modifications to
that original version [5, 6]. Roland Omne`s [7–11] also published a series of articles that
1 We thank Jeffrey Bub for pointing out this recent debate to us.
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contributed to the development of this theory. Simultaneously, Murray Gell-Mann and
James Hartle developed a similar formalism [12–14]. The Theory of Consistent Histories
extends the standard formalism of quantum mechanics in order to make it capable of defining
logical operations between events at different times. For this purpose, it introduces the
notion of history, which generalizes the notion of event: an elemental history is defined as
a sequence of events at different times, where an event is the occurrence of a property. But
since it is not possible to assign probabilities to the set of all histories, it is necessary to
select a subset of histories that satisfies additional conditions.
In order to analyze the defense of the F-R argument on the basis of the fact that the
assertions are made at different times, we will carefully reconstruct the argument in the
framework of the Theory of Consistent Histories. This task will allow us to prove that the
supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a
family of histories that is not consistent, a move that is not legitimate in the formalism that
provides us with the tools to make inferences on the basis of facts at different times.
II. THE F-R ARGUMENT
The Gedankenexperiment proposed in Frauchiger and Renner’s article is a sophisticated
reformulation of Wigner’s friend experiment [15]. In that original thought experiment,
Wigner considers the superposition state of a particle in a closed laboratory where his
friend is confined. When Wigner’s friend measures the particle, the state collapses to one
of its components. However, from the outside of the laboratory, Wigner still assigns a
superposition state to the whole composite system: Particle + Friend + Lab.
The F-R argument relies on duplicating Wigner’s setup. Let us consider two friends F1
and F2 located in separate and isolated labs L1 and L2.
2 F1 measures the observable C
of a biased “quantum coin” in the state |φ〉 = 1√
3
|h〉 +
√
2
3
|t〉, where |h〉 and |t〉 are the
eigenstates of C, and h and t are its respective eigenvalues. F1 prepares a qubit in the state
| ↓〉 if the outcome is h, or in the state | →〉 = |↑〉+|↓〉√
2
if the outcome is t, and sends it to F2.
When F2 receives the qubit, she measures its observable Sz. After these two measurements,
2 We slightly modify the original terminology for clarity.
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the state of the whole system composed of the two labs is:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
|H〉| ⇓〉+
√
2
3
|T 〉| ⇒〉, (1)
where
• |H〉 and |T 〉, eigenstates of an observable A with eigenvalues H and T , are the states
of the entire lab L1 when the outcome of F1’s measurement is h and t, respectively,
• | ⇑〉 and | ⇓〉, eigenstates of an observable B with eigenvalues ⇑ and ⇓, are the
states of the entire lab L2 when the outcome of F2’s measurement is +1/2 and −1/2,
respectively,
• | ⇒〉 = 1√
2
| ⇑〉+ 1√
2
|| ⇓〉.
The Gedankenexperiment continues by considering two “Wigner” observers, W1 and W2,
located outside the labs, who will respectively measure the observables X and Y of labs L1
and L2:
• X has the eigenvectors |failX〉 and |okX〉, such that:
|failX〉 = 1√
2
|H〉+ 1√
2
|T 〉, |okX〉 = 1√
2
|H〉 − 1√
2
|T 〉 (2)
• Y has the eigenvectors |failY 〉 and |okY 〉, such that:
|failY 〉 = 1√
2
| ⇓〉+ 1√
2
| ⇑〉, |okY 〉 = 1√
2
| ⇓〉 − 1√
2
| ⇑〉 (3)
Before analyzing the consequences of the experiment, Frauchiger and Renner point out
that their argument can be conceived as a no-go theorem [1] that proves that three “natural-
sounding” assumptions, (Q), (C), and (S), cannot al be valid:3
3 In the 2016 paper, Frauchiger and Renner implicitly consider (Q) and (C) as unavoidable: as a con-
sequence, they claim that their argument shows that “no single-world interpretation can be logically
consistent” and, therefore, “we are forced to give up the view that there is one single reality” [2]. By
contrast, in the 2018 paper, they stress that “the theorem itself is neutral in the sense that it does not tell
us which of these three assumptions is wrong” [1]; as a consequence, they admit the possibility of different
theoretical and interpretive viewpoints regarding their result, and include a table that shows which of the
three assumptions each interpretation or quantum theory violates.
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(Q) Compliance with quantum theory : Quantum mechanics is universally valid, that is,
it applies to systems of any complexity, including observers. Moreover, an agent knows that
a given proposition is true whenever the Born rule assigns probability 1 to it.
(C) Self-consistency : Different agents’ predictions are not contradictory.
(S) Single-world : From the viewpoint of an agent who carries out a particular measure-
ment, this measurement has one single outcome.
On the basis of the above considerations –experimental setup and assumptions– the F-R
argument proceeds as follows. First, in order to compute the probability that the measure-
ments of X and Y yield the results |okX〉 and |okY 〉, respectively, the state described by eq.
(1) must be expressed as:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
12
|okX〉|okY 〉 − 1√
12
|okX〉|failY 〉+ 1√
12
|failX〉|okY 〉+
√
3
4
|failX〉|failY 〉. (4)
From this equation, it is clear that the probability of obtaining okX and okY is 1/12.
The second part of the argument consists in showing that the observers involved in the
experiment can draw a conclusion different from the above one on the basis of the following
reasoning.4 Let us consider the probability that F2 obtains −1/2 in her Sz measurement
and W1 obtains |okX〉 in her X measurement; in order to compute this probability, the state
described by eq. (1) must be expressed as:
|Ψ〉 =
√
2
3
|failX〉| ⇓〉+ 1√
6
|failX〉| ⇑〉 − 1√
6
|okX〉| ⇑〉. (5)
From this equation it is easy to see that the considered probability is zero. Then, if W1
obtains |okX〉 in her X measurement on Lab L1, she can infer that the outcome of F2’s Sz
measurement on the qubit was +1/2. In turn, if F2 obtains +1/2 in her Sz measurement on
the qubit, she can infer that the outcome of F1’s C measurement on the quantum coin was
t, because otherwise F1 would send F2 the qubit in state | ↓〉. And if F1 obtains t in her C
measurement oon the quantum coin, she can infer that the outcome of W2’s Y measurement
on Lab L2 will be |failY 〉, because the outcome t is perfectly correlated with the state | ⇒〉
of lab L2, and | ⇒〉 = |failY 〉, see eq. (3). Therefore, from a nested reasoning it can be
concluded that, when W1 gets |okX〉, she can infer that W2 certainly gets |failY 〉. But this
conclusion contradicts what was inferred from eq. (4), that is, that there is a non-zero
probability that W1 gets |okX〉 and W2 gets |okY 〉.
4 We thank Jeffrey Bub for suggesting us this clear explanation of this part of the argument.
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The reactions to the F-R argument have been multiple and varied (see for example [16–22],
just to mention some of them). However, since the argument from which the contradiction
is obtained involves quantum properties at different times, it is necessary to consider a
description of the Gedankenexperiment using a theory of quantum histories. As far as we
know, there has not been a detailed reconstruction of the argument in terms of the Theory
of Consistent Histories. In Section IV we will offer such a description and we will draw the
conclusions that the formalism offers for this case.
Moreover, the vectors |H〉 and |T 〉 of the previous discusion are states of the measurement
instrument in lab L1, while the vectors | ⇑〉 and | ⇓〉 are states of the measurement instrument
in lab L2. However, the states of the measurement instruments of observers W1 and W2 are
not included. In the next section we give a complete description of the process including
the Hilbert spaces corresponding to all measurement instruments.
III. THE DIACHRONIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARGUMENT
Let us recall that in lab L1 there is a quantum coin in the initial state
|φ〉 = 1√
3
|h〉+
√
2
3
|t〉 ∈ HC , (6)
where HC is the Hilbert space of the coin. The initial state of the rest of lab L1 (including
observer F1) is |a0〉 ∈ HF1 . Therefore, the Hilbert space of the entire lab L1 is HL1 =
HC ⊗ HF1 . In turn, in the Lab L2 there is a qubit, which initially is in state |q0〉 ∈ Hq,
where Hq is the Hilbert space of the qubit. The initial state of the rest of the lab L2
(including observer F2) is |b0〉 ∈ HF2 . Therefore, the Hilbert space of the entire lab L2 is
HL2 = Hq ⊗HF2 .
ObserverW1 measures the observable X of the lab L1 with an apparatus, which is initially
in a state |w10〉 ∈ HW1 , where HW1 is the Hilbert space of the apparatus. In turn, observer
W2 measures the observable Y of lab L2 with an apparatus initially in a state |w20〉 ∈ HW2,
where HW2 is the Hilbert space of the corresponding apparatus.
Summing up, the Hilbert space of the entire process is H = HL1 ⊗ HL2 ⊗ HW1 ⊗ HW2,
and the initial state at time t0 is
|Ψ0〉 = |φ〉 ⊗ |a0〉 ⊗ |q0〉 ⊗ |b0〉 ⊗ |w10〉 ⊗ |w20〉 ∈ H. (7)
In what follows, we describe the consecutive processes.
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• Time interval (t0, t1): Observer F1 measures the quantum coin.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U10 in the Hilbert space HL1 =
HC ⊗HF1 , satisfying
U10 (|h〉 ⊗ |a0〉) = |h〉 ⊗ |ah〉 ≡ |H〉, U10 (|t〉 ⊗ |a0〉) = |t〉 ⊗ |at〉 ≡ |T 〉. (8)
• Time interval (t1, t2): Observer F1 prepares the qubit.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U21 in the Hilbert space HF1 ⊗Hq,
satisfying
U21 (|ah〉 ⊗ |q0〉) = |ah〉 ⊗ | ↓〉, U21 (|at〉 ⊗ |q0〉) = |at〉 ⊗ | →〉. (9)
• Time interval (t2, t3): Observer F2 measures the qubit
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U32 in the Hilbert space HL2 =
Hq ⊗HF2 , satisfying
U32(| ↓〉 ⊗ |b0〉) = | ↓〉 ⊗ |b↓〉 ≡ | ⇓〉, U32 (| ↑〉 ⊗ |b0〉) = | ↑〉 ⊗ |b↑〉 ≡ | ⇑〉. (10)
• Time interval (t3, t4): Observer W1 measures lab L1.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U43 in the Hilbert space HL1⊗HW1,
satisfying
U43 (|failX〉 ⊗ |w10〉) = |failX〉 ⊗ |w1 fail〉, U43 (|okX〉 ⊗ |w10〉) = |okX〉 ⊗ |w1 ok〉.
• Time interval (t4, t5): Observer W2 measures lab L2.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U54 in the Hilbert space HL2⊗HW2,
satisfying
U54 (|okY 〉 ⊗ |w20〉) = |okY 〉 ⊗ |w2 ok〉, U54 (|failY 〉 ⊗ |w20〉) = |failY 〉 ⊗ |w2 fail〉.
Once the steps for the time evolution are stablished, the argument leading to the contra-
dictory result, reviewed in Section II, should be written in terms of probabilities involving
properties at different times. For example, in Section II the value 1/12 was obtained for the
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probability for obtaining okX and okY . Considering the description of the time evolution
given in this section, we should write
Pr [(w2 ok, t5) ∧ (w1 ok, t4)] = 1
12
, (11)
with ∧ representing the logical conjunction. This expression is interpreted as the probability
for the measurement instrument of observer W1 to indicate w1 ok at time t4 and for the
measurement instrument of observer W2 to indicate w2 ok at the later time t5.
The second part of the argument is based on the following conditional probabilities
Pr [(b↑, t3) | (w1 fail, t4)] = 1, (12)
Pr [(at, t1) | (b↑, t3)] = 1, (13)
Pr [(w2 ok, t5) | (at, t1)] = 1. (14)
If the last three conditional probabilities could be considered simultaneously, then we could
infer the following conditional probability
Pr [(w2 ok, t5) | (w1 fail, t4)] = 1. (15)
Then, Pr [(w2 ok, t5) ∧ (w1 fail, t4)] > 0, which is in contradiction with equation (11).
Since the previous argument involves properties at different times, it is necessary a de-
scription in terms of a theory of quantum histories. In order to search for the possibility
of obtaining equations (11), (12), (13) and (14) simultaneously, in the next section we will
apply the Theory of Consistent Histories.
IV. THE F-R ARGUMENT IN TERMS OF QUANTUM HISTORIES
In what follows we present a brief summary of the Theory of Consistent Histories (TQH)
[4–14]. In quantum mechanics the properties of a system are represented by orthogonal
projectors. Since an elementary history is a sequence of properties at consecutive times,
the TQH represents each elementary history with a tensor product of orthogonal projectors.
For example, a history Π˘ = Π1 ⊗ ...⊗Πn represents a sequence of properties Π1, ..., Πn, at
times t1, ..., tn.
In order to define probabilities for quantum histories, it is necessary to define a family of
histories. For this purpose, first we have to choose a context of properties at each time ti,
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i.e., a set of projectors which sum the identity of H and which are mutually orthogonal:
ΠkiΠk′i = δkik′i Πki ,
∑
ki
Πki = IH, ki, k
′
i ∈ σi, i = 1, ..., n;
where IH is the identity of the Hilbert space H.
Second, we define the atomic histories Π˘k1,...,kn, choosing one projector Πki at each time
ti:
Π˘k1,...,kn = Πk1 ⊗ ...⊗ Πkn, (k1, ..., kn) ∈ σ˘, σ˘ = σ1 × ...× σn.
Then, we define the histories Π˘Λ summing the histories Π˘k1,...,kn with (k1, ..., kn) ∈ Λ ⊆ σ˘, i.e.,
Π˘Λ =
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈ΛΠ˘k1,...,kn. These histories represent disjunctions of the histories Π˘k1,...,kn.
Finally, the family of histories is the set obtained by making arbitrary disjunctions between
product histories.
If ρ0 is the initial state at time t0, the probability of a general history Π˘Λ is defined in
the following way:
Prρ0(Π˘Λ) = Tr{C†(Π˘Λ)ρ0C(Π˘Λ)}, (16)
where we have introduced the chain operator C(Π˘Λ) =
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈ΛC(Π˘k1,...,kn), in which
C(Π˘k1,...,kn) = Πk1(t0)Πk2(t0)...Πkn(t0), and Πki(t0) = U(t0, ti)ΠkiU(ti, t0),
with U(ti, tj) = e
−iH(ti−tj)/~.
In general, the probability definition given in equation (16) does not satisfy the axiom
of additivity. Therefore, to have a well-defined probability, the families of histories must
satisfy an additional condition, called consistency condition.
Tr
[
C†(Π˘k1,...,kn)ρ0C(Π˘k′1,...,k′n)
]
= 0, ∀ (k1, ..., kn) 6= (k′1, ..., k′n). (17)
In order to describe the F-R argument in terms of quantum histories, we first obtain the
probability for the measurement instrument of the observer W1 to indicate w1 ok at time t4
and for the measurement instrument of the observer W2 to indicate w2 ok at a later time t5.
A suitable context of properties at time t4 should include the properties w1 ok, w1 fail, and
has to be completed with the property ¬ (w1 ok ∨ w1 fail) (where ∨ is the disjunction and ¬
is the negation). This properties are represented by the following projectors:
Πw1 ok = IL1 ⊗ IL2 ⊗ |w1 ok〉〈w1 ok| ⊗ IW2,
Πw1 fail = IL1 ⊗ IL2 ⊗ |w1 fail〉〈w1 fail| ⊗ IW2, (18)
Π¬(w1 ok∨w1 fail) = IH −Πw1 fail − Πw1 ok ,
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where each IK is the identity of the corresponding Hilbert space HK . These three projectors
provide a context of properties of the Hilbert space H.
For the time t5, a suitable context of properties should include the properties of the
measurement instrument of observer W2, i.e., w1 ok, w1 fail and has to be completed with the
property ¬ (w1 ok ∨ w1 fail). This properties are represented by the following projectors:
Πw2 ok = IL1 ⊗ IL2 ⊗ IW1 ⊗ |w2 ok〉〈w2 ok|,
Πw2 fail = IL1 ⊗ IL2 ⊗ IW1 ⊗ |w2 fail〉〈w2 fail|, (19)
Π¬(w2 ok∨w2 fail) = IH −Πw2 fail − Πw2 ok .
These three projectors also provide a context of properties of the Hilbert space H.
From the contexts of properties for times t4 and t5 we can generate a family of two-times
histories, whose atomic histories are Π˘k4,k5 = Πk4 ⊗ Πk5 , with Πk4 one of the projectors of
equations (18) and Πk5 one of the projectors of equations (19). It is easy to verify that
the family generated by these atomic histories satisfies the consistency conditions given in
equation (17). Therefore, equation (16) can be used to compute
Pr [(w2 ok, t5) ∧ (w1 ok, t4)] = 1
12
. (20)
This shows that using the Theory of Consistent Histories, and explicitly considering the
measurement instruments as quantum systems, we reobtain the same result given in Section
III for the first part of the argument.
In the same way, different consistent families of two-times histories can be defined to
deduce equations (12), (13) and (14). However, if the three equations are going to be used
together in the same argument, it is necessary to have a consistent family of four-times
histories including the possible results of the instrument of the observer F1 at time t1, the
possible results of the instrument of the observer F2 at time t3, the possible results of the
instrument of observer W1 at time t4, and the possible results of the instrument of observer
W2 at time t5. But such a family of histories does not satisfied the consistency conditions,
given in equation (17).
To prove this statement, let us consider two histories Π˘α and Π˘β, representing different
results for the four measurements, and with the following chain operators
C(Π˘α) = U(t0, t1)ΠatU(t1, t3)Πb↑U(t3, t4)Πw1 okU(t4, t5)Πw2 okU(t5, t0), (21)
C(Π˘β) = U(t0, t1)ΠahU(t1, t3)Πb↓U(t3, t4)Πw1 okU(t4, t5)Πw2 okU(t5, t0), (22)
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and
Πat = IC ⊗ |at〉〈at| ⊗ IL2 ⊗ IW1 ⊗ IW2, (23)
Πah = IC ⊗ |ah〉〈ah| ⊗ IL2 ⊗ IW1 ⊗ IW2 , (24)
Πb↑ = IL1 ⊗ Iq ⊗ |b↑〉〈b↑| ⊗ IW1 ⊗ IW2, (25)
Πb↓ = IL1 ⊗ Iq ⊗ |b↓〉〈b↓| ⊗ IW1 ⊗ IW2. (26)
Considering the unitary time evolution of the complete quantum system and the initial
state defined in equation (7), we obtain
C†(Π˘α)|Ψ0〉 = C†(Π˘β)|Ψ0〉 = 1√
12
U(t0, t5)(|okX〉 ⊗ |okY 〉 ⊗ |w1 ok〉 ⊗ |w2 ok〉), (27)
and therefore, according with equation (17), the consistency condition gives
Tr
[
C†(Π˘α)|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|C(Π˘β)
]
= 〈Ψ0|C(Π˘β)C†(Π˘α)|Ψ0〉 = 1
12
6= 0. (28)
This proves that the histories Π˘α and Π˘β do not satisfy the consistency condition and, there-
fore, there is no family of consistent histories to describe the results of the four measurement
instruments of the F-R experiment.
Summing up, since the conclusion of the second part of the F-R argument is based on an
illegitimate inference, the supposed contradiction of the F-R argument does not hold.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In a previous article [3] one of us argued that the contradiction resulting from the F-R
argument is inferred by making classical conjunctions between different and incompatible
contexts and, as a consequence, it is the result of a theoretically illegitimate inference.
However, it has been suggested that the criticism does not take into account the fact that
the inferences in the F-R argument are all carefully timed, and this fact would circumvent the
objection based on the contextuality of quantum mechanics. In the present article we have
shown that, if timing really matters in the F-R argument, then it must be reconstructed
by means of a formalism that allows dealing with quantum properties at different times,
something that is not formally defined in the standard formalism.
In order to deal with arguments with quantum properties at different times, we applied
the Theory of Consistent Histories, and we showed that the contradiction resulting from
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the F-R argument is inferred by computing probabilities in a family of histories that is not
consistent, a move that is not legitimate in the context of the theory that allows making
inferences on the basis of facts at different times.
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